July Iran news

biAzar

biAzar

Coach
#121
Oct 18, 2002
14,471
5
Antelope Valley,California
#121
از شمال تا جنوب، نمایندگانی که دولتی***ها را کتک می***زنند




کارکنان دولت در حال رفتن را راحت***تر می***توان مورد ضرب و شتم قرار داد. برای همین ***است که از شمال و جنوب کشور خبر می***رسد ***مدیران دولتی از معدود نمایندگان مجلس سیلی می***خورند. آیا مدیران دولت روحانی نیز کتک خواهند خورد یا راه برای تکرار کتک***کاری فیزیکی و غیر فیزیکی بین مقامات بسته خواهد شد؟
کد خبر: ۳۳۳۵۷۰تاریخ انتشار: ۳۱ تير ۱۳۹۲ - ۲۳:۱۵
روزنامه جمهوری اسلامی در شماره یکشنبه، سی***ام تیر ماه خود نوشته است، یکی از نمایندگان آبادان در مجلس شورای اسلامی، سیلی محکمی به صورت معاون شرکت آب و فاضلاب خوزستان نواخته است. معاون شرکت آب و فاضلاب خوزستان که برای بازدید از وضعیت آب***رسانی به مردم یکی از مناطق جنوب استان رفته بود، پس از آن که نماینده یاد شده بعد از بحثی کوتاه به صورت او سیلی می***زند، نقش زمین شده است.


به گزارش «تابناک»، این دومین مورد از اخبار منتشره درباره توسل معدودی از نمایندگان مجلس به ضرب و شتم کارکنان دولت در کمتر از ده روز اخیر است. پیش از این هم در خبر***ها آمده بود که نماینده تالش اقدام به ضرب و شتم مدیرکل منابع طبیعی استان گیلان کرده است.

در این باره، رییس سازمان نظام مهندسی کشاورزی و منابع طبیعی استان گیلان درباره ضرب و شتم*** چندی پیش مدیرکل منابع طبیعی استان گیلان از سوی نماینده مردم تالش در مجلس شورای اسلامی*** گفته است: به دلیل عدم تمکین مدیرکل طبیعی استان گیلان در هنگام مأموریت به زیاده***خواهی نماینده شهرستان تالش در مجلس شورای اسلامی در تقاضای صدور مجوز افزایش بهره***برداری از جنگل***های تالش برای شرکت بهره***برداری جنگل شفارود، این مدیرکل مورد فحاشی و ضرب و شتم مستقیم این نماینده مجلس در حضور تعدادی از مدیران استانی و کشوری قرار گرفت.

جالب آن ***که مدیرکل محیط زیست گیلان با یادآوری رخدادهای مشابه و تلخ گذشته که برای رئیس وقت اداره محیط زیست شهرستان آستارا و رئیس اداره محیط زیست شهرستان آستانه اشرفیه رخ داده است افزوده: سه سال پیش، راننده کامیون شهرداری لوندویل به دستور شهردار وقت این شهر با کامیون خود*** عمدی به رئیس اداره محیط زیست آستارا ـ که مانع از برداشت غیرمجاز شن و ماسه توسط وی شده بود ـ حمله*** و وی را مصدوم کرد.

ظاهرا دلیل اعلام شده برای ضرب و شتم این مسئول گیلانی، مخالفت وی با افزایش پروانه بهره***برداری از جنگل شفارود است. گفته می***شود، از اسفند ماه سال گذشته، درخواست***های این نماینده از مدیرکل منابع طبیعی استان گیلان آغاز شده و وی خواستار افزایش سهمیه بهره***برداری از جنگل***های شفارود به نفع شرکت سهامی جنگل شفارود شده، بدون آن که تعهدات متقابل در قبال جنگل را انجام دهد.

توسل به استفاده از زور و یا توهین در برخورد با کارکنان دولت، هر چند در روزهای آخر یک دولت آسان***تر به نظر می***رسد، به هر حال مستوجب مجازات***هایی برای مرتکب آن بنا بر قوانین کشور است؛ هر چند*** انجام چنین مجازاتی نیز نمی***تواند زشتی حمایت یک نماینده مجلس از درخواست***های غیرقانونی ادعایی در بهره***برداری غیر مجاز از جنگل را بپوشاند.

به نظر می***رسد برای جلوگیری از وقوع اتفاق مشابه در آینده، مرور چند حادثه مهم در سالیان اخیر سودمند باشد.

یکی از مهم***ترین این مسائل تغییرات دولت نهم در نظام برنامه***ریزی کشور در سال***های ۸۵ و ۸۶ است که با وجود همه مخالفت***های کار***شناسی عملی شد، ولی قرار است با اراده مشترک دولت جدید و مجلس نهم سازمان برنامه***ریزی کشور در قالبی جدید احیا شود.

دلیل مطرح ***از سوی دولت نهم برای انحلال سازمان برنامه، ایجاد مانع توسط کار***شناسان آن در روند مسائل اجرایی کشور و آلوده شدن آن به فشار***ها برای تخصیص منابع بود. جدای از این که دلیل مطرح ***چقدر درست و جدی بوده ***و اینکه آیا روش استفاده شده در دولت نهم روشی مناسب برای رفع مشکل بوده است یا نه، توجه به این نکته مهم است که حذف سازمان برنامه، بخش***هایی از دولت را در مقابل فشارهای بیرونی بدون حفاظ کرده است. حتی برخی از خود نمایندگان مجلس پذیرفته***اند که بعضی از سیاسیون از ابزارهای نظارتی برای پیشبرد برنامه***های منطقه***ای خود بهره گیرند.

از سوی دیگر، احمدی***نژاد در مهر ماه سال 91 در نامه***ای به مسئولان اجرایی نوشت: «ضمن اعتقاد به لزوم تعامل فعال و سازنده با مجلس شورای اسلامی در چهارچوب قانون، لازم است از پذیرش و ***انجام هر گونه کاری که شائبه دخالت در عزل و نصب مدیران اجرایی را در اثر فشار یا خواست نمایندگان مجلس متبلور می***کند جداً خودداری کنند***».

این نامه جدای از انگیزه نوشتن آن، نشان دهنده نگرانی از دخالت***های بیرونی در کار اجرا و حتی عزل و نصب***های اداری است. حجت***الاسلام روحانی در نخستین حضور خود به عنوان رئیس جمهور منتخب در مجلس شورای اسلامی از جبران آسیب***ها به جایگاه مجلس سخن گفت ولی ظاهرا در نگاهی دیگر باید به تنظیم دقیق رابطه بین دستگاه اجرایی با دیگران نیاز است، به گونه***ای که یک مدیر کل، اختیار صدور مجوز بهره***برداری غیرمجاز از جنگل را نداشته باشد که از وی انتظار چنین کاری وجود داشته باشد و از سوی دیگر، در صورتی که وی تن به کار غیرقانونی نداد مورد ضرب و شتم قرار نگیرد!
 
P

Playboy

Banned
#123
Oct 18, 2010
6,271
849
#123
Bi-honar said:
[video=youtube_share;CAL4BpaBGzY]http://youtu.be/CAL4BpaBGzY[/video]
Click to expand...
can not really argue with his logic.the u.s. policy towards iran is being held hostage by the aipac agents in congress and their ultimate goal is to start a war between iran and the usa.they have sabotaged made deals before.the last one was the one brokered by turkey and brazil with obama's blessing but once the deal was reached it was essentially vetoed by aipac agents in the u.s. policy making apparatus.
 
Zob Ahan

Zob Ahan

Elite Member
#124
Feb 4, 2005
17,481
2,233
#124
Playboy said:
can't read persian but if you have paid attention you knew automakers everywhere have been going through a hard time why should iran will be any different?
Click to expand...
I didn't know you can't read Persian chief but what does that have to do with the people hating on the auto companies. On a separate note the automakers in the other countries are not gov't owned Chief.
 
P

Playboy

Banned
#125
Oct 18, 2010
6,271
849
#125
biAzar

biAzar

Coach
#128
Oct 18, 2002
14,471
5
Antelope Valley,California
#128
جنگ گرگها؛ تسویه*** حساب لاریجانی با سپاه٬ مصباح و جنتی

دیگربان: علی لاریجانی و فراکسیون «رهروان ولایت» پس از انتخابات ریاست جمهوری سال ۹۲ تسویه حساب با سپاه پاسداران٬ شورای نگهبان٬ محمدتقی مصباح یزدی و «جبهه پایداری» را آغاز کرده***اند.

فراکسیون «رهروان ولایت» که زیر نظر علی لاریجانی در مجلس اداره می***شود در نخستین گام خود مانع از ادامه حضور عباسعلی کدخدایی در شورای نگهبان شد که این اقدام فراکسیون یادشده با انتقاد و «گلایه» فراکسیون «اصول***گرایان» و غلامعلی حداد عادل مواجه شده است.

اعضای این فراکسیون در شرایطی رای به حذف کدخدایی از شورای نگهبان دادند که وی در سال***های اخیر برخورد***های نامناسبی با گروهی از آنها داشت.

فراکسیون «رهروان ولایت» که به واسطه علی لاریجانی رابطه دوستانه***ای نیز با اکبر هاشمی رفسنجانی دارد٬ با حذف کدخدایی واکنش معناداری به رد صلاحیت هاشمی رفسنجانی از سوی این شورا در انتخابات ریاست جمهوری سال ۹۲ نشان داد.

این فراکسیون و علی لاریجانی در دومین گام خود تلاش***ها برای قرائت گزارش کمیته حقیقت***یاب مجلس درباره وقایع ۲۲ بهمن سال گذشته قم را نیز آغاز کرده***اند.

در این گزارش موسسه «امام خمینی»٬ گروه «پرتو» وابسته به محمدتقی مصباح یزدی و سپاه پاسداران به عنوان سه عامل اصلی این وقایع معرفی شده***اند.

نمایندگان عضو فراکسیون «اصول***گرایان» نیز که رابطه نزدیکی با مصباح یزدی و سپاه دارند هم نسبت قرائت علنی این گزارش هشدار داده***اند.

در صورت انتشار علنی این گزارش٬ دومین گام لاریجانی و گروهی از نمایندگان مجلس در تسویه حساب با سپاه٬ مصباح یزدی و «جبهه پایداری» با موفقیت برداشته خواهد شد
..
 
P

Playboy

Banned
#133
Oct 18, 2010
6,271
849
#133
this is why iran's leader said he does not trust negotiations with p5+1 because they are not sincere.he compromised and iran stopped enrichment for 18 months and got nothing out of it in return.as gw said "you fool once shame on me you fool me twice......"

Bogged down in faltering nuclear talks with the European powers nearly 10 years ago, Hassan Rouhani did something that no Iranian diplomat before or since has managed to do. He took out his cellphone, say Western diplomats who were there, dialed up his longtime friend and associate, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and convinced him that Iran needed to suspend nuclear enrichment. The call by Mr. Rouhani, who was elected president in June and will take office next week, resulted in an agreement in October 2003, the only nuclear deal between Iran and the West in the past 11 years.


http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/w...optimism-in-iran-and-west.html?pagewanted=all
 
Zob Ahan

Zob Ahan

Elite Member
#137
Feb 4, 2005
17,481
2,233
#137
آبروریزی در مغولستان/ بیرون کردن کشتی***گیران تیم ملی از هتل و ضبط پاسپورت***ها!


» سرویس: ورزشي - كشتي، رزمي


کد خبر: 92050603168

یکشنبه ۶ مرداد ۱۳۹۲ - ۱۱:۵۱

hemmat khahi-18-8.jpg


اعضای تیم کشتی فرنگی نوجوانان ایران که برای حضور در رقابت***های قهرمانی آسیا در مغولستان به سر می***برند، به خاطر بدهی به هتل، از محل اقامت خود بیرون شدند و پاسپورتهای آنها ضبط شد.



به گزارش خبرگزاری دانشجویان ایران (ایسنا)، قرار بود فرنگی***کاران نوجوان ایران پس از کسب مقام سومی در آسیا دیشب به تهران بازگردند اما به خاطر تسویه نشدن پول هتل، مسوولان هتل با نگه داشتن پاسپورت آنها، اعضای تیم را از هتل بیرون کردند و به همین دلیل نوجوانان در مکان دیگری اقامت کردند.



هم***چنین سرپرست تیم ملی کشتی فرنگی نوجوانان درباره***ی این موضوع اظهار کرد: من دیشب به تهران بازگشتم و از اتفاقات مغولستان خبر دقیقی ندارم اما می***دانم که در آن***جا بانک و سفارت نداشتیم. به خاطر همین برای حواله کردن پول با مشکل مواجه بودیم. قرار بود تیم دیشب به تهران بازگردد اما چون با هتل تسویه نکرده بودند این کار صورت نگرفت. البته من با سرمربی تیم صحبت کردم و گفته***اند که گویا پول حواله شده و قرار است تیم طی امروز و فردا به تهران بازگردد.



دبیر فدراسیون کشتی در این زمینه به ایسنا گفت: چون در مغولستان سفارت نداشتیم برای واریز پول با مشکل مواجه شدیم اما با تلاشی که انجام دادیم از طرف فدراسیون کسی را مامور این کار کردیم و مشکل را به زودی حل خواهیم کرد.



وی افزود: متاسفانه شرایط فدراسیون بسیار سخت است و از نظر بودجه در مضیقه است.



به گزارش ایسنا، این اتفاقات در حالی می***افتد که مشخص نیست چرا قبل از اعزام تیم پول هتل به سرپرست تیم داده نشده و یا این پول توسط تیم آزاد به مغولستان ارسال نشده تا این گونه با ابروی نمایندگان ورزش ایران در کشوری دیگر بازی شود و پاسپورتهایشان گرو گرفته شود.



انتهای پیام
 
Bi-honar

Bi-honar

Coach
#138
Jun 9, 2004
13,753
1
Canada
#138
Rohani picked Zarif to be his FM:


Iran nominee seen as olive branch to United States

By Marcus George and Paul Taylor
DUBAI/PARIS | Mon Jul 29, 2013 5:31pm EDT


(Reuters) - If Iranian President-elect Hassan Rouhani wanted to signal his determination to rebuild relations with the United States and strike a "grand bargain," he could hardly do better than pick Mohammad Javad Zarif as his foreign minister. Iranian news agencies reported on Monday that Zarif, a former ambassador to the United Nations and Tehran's leading connoisseur of the U.S. political elite, is set to be in the cabinet Rouhani will announce after taking office on Sunday. A source close to Rouhani confirmed Zarif will be nominated as foreign minister. A fluent English speaker who earned his doctorate at the University of Denver, Zarif has been at the center of several secret negotiations to try to overcome 35 years of estrangement between Washington and Tehran, diplomats said.

Those talks failed because of deep mistrust on a range of disputes from Iran's secretive nuclear program and support for anti-Israeli militants to U.S. sanctions and hopes of engineering "regime change" in Tehran. Zarif's elevation, however, suggests the moderate new president is keen to make another try at breaking the deadlock. "He was always trying to do what was possible to improve relations in a very intelligent, open and clear way," said a senior Western diplomat who had repeated dealings with Zarif. "This is someone who knows the United States very well and with all the frustrations of the past is still someone they know in Washington," he said.

The usual caveats about Iran apply: under the Islamic Republic's complex institutional set-up, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei calls the shots in foreign and security policy and controls the nuclear program, which Western powers say is aimed at developing atomic weapons. The foreign minister ranks roughly fourth in the foreign policy pecking order, after Khamenei, the head of the National Security Council, who also serves as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, and the president. Nevertheless, assuming he is confirmed by Iran's prickly, conservative-dominated parliament, Zarif's appointment would be a strong gesture of positive intent towards the United States. The two countries have had no official ties since 1980 after Iranian students occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking 52 diplomats hostage in protest against Washington's admission of the former Shah after he was toppled by the Islamic revolution.

CONTACT BOOK

Zarif's Washington contact book includes Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and a who's who of U.S. national security officials on both sides of the aisle. The soft-spoken career diplomat resigned from the nuclear negotiating team after hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005. In 2007, he returned from New York after five years as Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations and found himself out of favor as his country turned its back on the notion of seeking better ties with the West and Ahmadinejad sidelined English-speaking diplomats. Since then, Zarif has been in a holding pattern, nominally senior adviser to the foreign minister from 2007 to 2010, then from 2011 international director of Islamic Azad University, a network of educational institutions established by ex-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, his political patron.

Rafsanjani, who is also Rouhani's mentor, has long favored a pragmatic rapprochement with the United States, but Khamenei has stamped on all such efforts since he succeeded the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in 1989. Dennis Ross, a veteran U.S. diplomat who served as President Barack Obama's top Middle East adviser until 2011, said Zarif had shown a willingness to negotiate in good faith and his appointment would be seen in Washington and Europe as an indication that Rouhani wants to "do business" with the West. But he cautioned that the question remained whether this would translate into an easing of Tehran's resistance to curbing its nuclear drive. "Zarif is not someone who does favors for the United States," Ross said. "He fits the category of a sign or signal until you see Iran actually doing something."

Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President George H.W. Bush, described Zarif as "reasonable" but said much would depend on how much leeway he is given. Western diplomats said Zarif was a central negotiator in the last major effort to negotiate a "grand bargain" between Tehran and Washington that began after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States and foundered in mid-2003. U.S. newspapers published in 2007 the bare text of a draft agreement, put together in secret talks in Paris, Geneva and New York, that would have established negotiations between the two countries on all outstanding issues.

While the draft fell short of an agreement on substance, it noted both sides' expectations on issues such as assurances that Iran's nuclear program has no military capability, and assurances that the United States would act against anti-government People's Mujahideen activists based in Iraq. "The texts are authentic," said a Western diplomat who was involved in the back-channel talks, confirming that Khamenei had given the green light for negotiations to go ahead.

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATOR

Years earlier, as a junior diplomat Zarif was involved in negotiations to win the release of U.S. hostages held by pro-Iranian gunmen in Lebanon, according to the memoirs of former U.N. envoy Giandomenico Picco. Even though the United States did not make a promised reciprocal goodwill gesture at the time, Zarif remained committed to improving ties. In Washington, Trita Parsi, president of the pro-dialogue National Iranian American Council, said Zarif has been involved in multiple U.S.-Iranian negotiations, including talks on Afghanistan after the U.S.-led 2001 invasion, and Tehran's 2003 proposal for a "grand bargain" with the United States. "Based on my interviews with him, (Zarif) was involved in the drafting of it," Parsi said of that offer of a comprehensive new start, which then President George W. Bush's administration spurned.

Veteran U.S. diplomat James Dobbins, the U.S. point man at a 2001 Bonn conference that formed a new Afghan government after the overthrow of the Taliban, credited Zarif with a pivotal, positive role in the diplomacy - and with a sense of humor. Dobbins - now the State Department's special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan - recalled in 2007 testimony to the U.S. Congress how Zarif, then a deputy foreign minister, persuaded the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance to drop its demand for control of an outsize proportion of Afghan ministries.

The Northern Alliance delegate "remained obdurate. Finally, Zarif took him aside and whispered to him for a few moments, following which the Northern Alliance envoy returned to the table and said: ‘Okay, I agree. The other factions can have two more ministries. And we can create three more, which they can also have.' We had a deal," Dobbins recalled. "Zarif had achieved the final breakthrough without which the (Hamid) Karzai government might never have been formed."
 
Zob Ahan

Zob Ahan

Elite Member
#140
Feb 4, 2005
17,481
2,233
#140
Why You Shouldn't Get Too Excited About Rouhani

The new president is technically a "moderate," but in Iran, that doesn't mean much.

Mark DubowitzJun 17 2013, 9:00 AM ET











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rowhani-banner.jpg
A supporter of Hassan Rouhani holds up his poster at a celebration gathering in Tehran on June 15, 2013. (AP)

Good riddance: The end of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad era should be welcomed by all who want to see a free and democratic Iran and a peaceful resolution to the ongoing nuclear crisis with Tehran. But the election victory of Hassan Rouhani as Iran's new president has revived a myth as old as that of the revolutionary theocracy, itself: The myth of moderation.

The White House cautiously expressed hope that the regime now will "make responsible choices that create a better future for all Iranians," and declared its readiness to "engage the Iranian government in order to reach a diplomatic solution" to "the international community's concerns about Iran's nuclear program." The press and the pundits were less cautious in their enthusiasm, describing Rouhani as a "moderate," a "centrist," and a "reformist," whose tenure as nuclear negotiator demonstrated a "more cooperative" Islamic Republic.

It is understandable to hope that Rouhani's victory might usher in more freedom for Iran's brutalized people. Indeed, those who genuinely care about Iranian human rights abuses should be testing Rouhani's moderation by insisting that he free all Iranian political prisoners, including 2009 presidential candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, who have been under house arrest for over two years without trial.

But, the euphoria for Rouhani ignores his history. Rouhani is a supreme loyalist, and a true believer, who lived in Paris in exile with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and followed him to Iran. He was a political commissar in the regular military, where he purged some of Iran's finest officers, and a member of the Supreme Defense Council responsible for the continuation of the Iran-Iraq War, at a great cost in Iranian lives, even after all Iranian territories were liberated. He rose to become both Secretary of Iran's powerful Supreme National Council in 1989, and Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, under former Iranian presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and his successor Mohammad Khatami.

More recently, on the nuclear issue, Rouhani's campaign statements are nothing to celebrate, either.

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Rouhani's record as Iran's lead negotiator with the EU3 -- Britain, France and Germany -- demonstrates more deception than moderation. If Ahmadinejad, and Iran's most recent nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, were infamous for their bluntness, Rouhani has masterfully wielded temperate rhetoric to mask an iron determination to expand Iran's nuclear program.

In 2004, Rouhani described Iranian nuclear policy as a twin strategy of "confidence-building and...build[ing] up our technical capability," with the goal of "cooperating with Europe" in order to divide Europe from the United States. Rouhani's deputy at the Supreme National Security Council, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, described this as the "widen the transatlantic gap" strategy. In the third presidential debate of the most recent election, in a discussion on Iran's nuclear program, Rouhani bragged that Iran was able to "import foreign technology from abroad," and stressed that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei guided his nuclear diplomacy.

In 2008, former Khatami administration spokesman Abdollah Ramezanzadeh described Rouhani's nuclear strategy during a panel debate covered by the Fars News Agency: "During the confidence-building era we entered the nuclear club, and despite the suspension [of uranium enrichment], we imported all the materials needed for our nuclear activities of the country...The solution is to prove to the entire world that we want the power plants for electricity. Afterwards we can proceed with other activities..."

Ramezanzadeh further elaborated on Iran's strategy: "As long as we were not subjected to sanctions, and during our negotiations we could import technology, we should have negotiated for so long, and benefited from the atmosphere of negotiations to the extent that we could import all the technology needed. The adversary wanted the negotiations to come to a dead end and initiate a new phase. But we wanted to continue negotiations until the U.S. would be gone from the circle of negotiations."

Ramezanzadeh summed it up this way: "We had one overt policy, which was one of negotiation and confidence building, and a covert policy, which was continuation of the activities...in the field of confidence building, Japan is the most advanced country in the world but Japan can produce a nuclear bomb in less than a week."

In supporting the argument for Rouhani's moderation, much is made of his role in Iran's decision to temporarily suspend uranium enrichment in 2004. But it is worth remembering that this decision was not only a diplomatic feint to head off sanctions and continue importing nuclear technology as Ramezanzadeh suggests. It was also inspired by a genuine fear that the "mad-bomber Bush" would target Tehran after quickly disposing of Saddam and the Iraqi military in 2003.

To be sure, during the election campaign, Rouhani projected moderation relative to his competitors. He ran on a "policy of reconciliation and peace," and criticized nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and outgoing president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for reckless diplomacy that united the U.S., Europe, and the international community in support of unprecedented global sanctions to punish Iran for its uncompromising nuclear stance.

In the face of increasingly crippling sanctions, Iranians appeared to embrace the "anyone-but-Jalili" vote, if only to counter the candidate who appeared to be Khamenei's first choice. Rouhani, after all, promised that his moderate positions could bring the West around to authorize sanctions relief before the Iranian economy collapses.

Rouhani, however, is only the most moderate of the eight hardline candidates who were hand-selected by Khamenei. And even if he truly were committed to nuclear reconciliation, Rouhani, like Ahmadinejad, lacks the power to alter Iran's nuclear trajectory. As Rouhani acknowledged during the campaign, Khamenei remains in charge of Iran's nuclear policy.

Rouhani's victory may be a temporary political setback for Khamenei, who might have preferred a more politically pliant president like Jalili who would help preserve the interfactional power balance between the supreme leader, the clerics, the Revolutionary Guards, and the bazaaris (middle-class merchants).

But on the question of Iran's nuclear policy, the election might be a godsend for the supreme leader, who can now offer up a more soft-spoken, cosmopolitan, and diplomatic president to convince the West to ease sanctions, even while Khamenei is unprepared to relinquish his nuclear program.

Accordingly, Khamenei will likely allow Rouhani to engage with the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany (the P5+1) in another round of nuclear negotiations. If Rouhani starts sounding too conciliatory, Khamenei will blame his new president for selling out Iran's interests. But he also could allow Rouhani to rope-a-dope the P5+1 by offering a deal to minimize Iran's stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium.

Such an offer, if presented by Rouhani as a step toward "reconciliation and peace," may be enough to tie up the West for sufficient time to undermine international support for sanctions, get Iranian oil flowing again, stabilize the economy, and even help Rouhani deliver on his election promises. But an offer that only limits Iran's 20 percent-enriched uranium stockpile, without other more rigorous nuclear safeguards, would not be sufficient to arrest Iran's nuclear weapons development.

Iran's new president knows this and he will negotiate to "widen the P5+1 gap" on these nuclear demands. He will remain focused on an objective that he, Khamenei, Rafsanjani, Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and the Revolutionary Guards have been committed to for years: Playing for time in order to reach an industrial-size nuclear weapons capacity and a nuclear breakout which will allow Iran, without detection, to produce enough weapons-grade uranium or separated plutonium for one or more bombs.

In other words, the election of Rouhani, a loyalist of Iran's supreme leader and a master of nuclear deceit, doesn't get us any closer to stopping Iran's nuclear drive.
 
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