Honestly, I read the article and I thought it made some dumb arguments. It glosses over the fact that the extremist faction in Iran had already waged a war on every hezb, jonbesh and minority that didn't adhere to their nutty ideology. Even other religiously organized political groups weren't spared, though at least they weren't purged like all the others. It mentions the hostage crisis but then conveniently ignores the important point that the hostage taking highlighted the confrontational intentions of the shia islamists in Iran. This was already a war in many ways.
However, the article's main point is pretty clear. I don't really see all these other "dimensions" in the authors argument.
FZ jaan, it didn't gloss over those facts - it made it very clear from the very first sentence that "when Ayatollah Khomeini rode an
Islamist wave to create a new republic, mass executions and war with Iraq followed". Then it lays out the reasons for why the military action was justified in the minds of the Egyptians, that "a rushed constitution, fears of a creeping
Islamisation of the government, and limited progress on the economy were all cited as driving the resistance to his administration" (all very important factors that have not yet sank in for some of our friends here).
Then it goes on for the next 13 or so paragraphs painting a picture of what another "
Islamic revolution" and the "declaration of an
Islamic Republic" could have possibly meant for Egypt: "eight years of war, the most extensive use of chemical weaponry in several generations, and hundreds of thousands dead". He continues the parallel between Morsi's Islamization of Egypt to what happened in Iran: "
Islamic dress for women was imposed universally the following summer. Bani Sadr was impeached, and all political parties bar the Khomeini-ist
Islamic Republican party banned. By the end of 1981, the political leadership [Islamists] that would see out the war had been established".
He's basically suggesting that Morsi was on the same path and had he been allowed to create a conflict, he too would have "distracted from the regime's consolidation and draconian exercise of power; and provided a rally-around-the-flag effect, which the regime [would have] further exploited to facilitate its liquidation of the opposition en masse." Now, our friends want to skip all those 16 or so paragraphs and dozens of references to Islamism and Islamists to suggest that the entire article is in fact talking about the army, not Mosis's government and Islamization of Egypt - not understanding at all, that is the "paradigm" the author decides to "shift a little" in the last two paragraphs!!!
The last two paragraphs are not referring to the initial military take-over or negating everything the author has said up to that point about the dangers of Islamism and Islamization. "
The blundering, heavy-handed, and hardly homogenous Muslim Brotherhood that sustained Morsi's presidency"
MAY "in the brutality now being visited upon it, find a new cause for unity." In essence, the last two paragraphs are just about the crackdown on the Brotherhood in the last two weeks and are a valid concern. I don't think many would argue that possibility is not there and things MAY not end up that way.
What I would have liked to see instead as a closing, not to confuse subjective or novice readers, would have been to extend the Iranian parallel and what's happening to MB with the same brutality that was visited upon all other Iranian opposition forces in those first 2 to 3 years of the revolution. Did the violent crackdown on the MKO, Hezbe Toudeh, Fadaiyoon Khalg, etc., which was multiples worse than the army crackdown on MB help them unite and come back stronger against the Islamic regime?!