http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict/choice_3775.jsp
Lebanon: the world's choice Paul Rogers
Lebanon: the world's choice
Paul Rogers
28 - 7 - 2006
The first two weeks of August will be decisive in determining
whether the Lebanon war escalates further or can be contained.
Paul Rogers is professor of peace studies at Bradford
University, northern England. He has been writing a
weekly column on global security on openDemocracy since
October 2001
Paul Rogers tracks the July 2006 war in a series of
daily columns:
"Israel, Lebanon, and beyond: the danger of escalation"
(17 July 2006)
"War defeats diplomacy" (18 July 2006)
"A proxy war"
(19 July 2006)
"Israel: losing control" (20 July 2006)
"Hit Beirut, target Tehran" (21 July 2006)
"Lebanon in the wider war" (25 July 2006)
"Lebanon: no quick fix" (26 July 2006)
"A triple front: Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon"
(27 July 2006)
The failure of the emergency Rome summit on the middle east on
26 July to call for an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon has been
taken by the Ehud Olmert government in Israel to be a green
light for intensified military operations.
Israel is calling up three divisions of reservists -initially
around 15,000 troops, leading eventually to 30,000 - for what
is likely to be a protracted operation in southern Lebanon.
This, however, may not take the form of an all-out invasion
and occupation, not least because memories of the Israeli
Defence Forces (IDF) retreat from the region in the early
1980s are still a strong deterrent to that option.
Instead, the more likely development is devastating air
operations to clear localities, allowing IDF troops to operate
afterwards with less risk to themselves. Olmert's close ally,
the justice minister Haim Ramon, stated on Israeli army radio
on 27 July that the Israeli government had given sufficient
opportunity for civilians to leave southern Lebanon, and
Israel could therefore assume that "all those in south
Lebanon are terrorists who are related in some way to
Hizbollah".
In his view, this meant that villages could be destroyed by
the Israeli air force before ground troops moved in. The term
"scorched earth" usually refers to the behaviour of retreating
armies; the approach recommended here would, instead, be part
of an offensive operation.
The fact that the IDF feels obliged to embark on such a
strategy is an indication of the problems it is facing in
trying to control and defeat the Hizbollah movement. Some of
these problems have been covered in earlier columns in this
series over the past ten days; they include the continuing
large number of missiles being fired into northern Israel two
weeks after the war started, and the use of an advanced
anti-ship missile to cripple the Saar-5 missile corvette two
weeks ago (see "Israel, Lebanon, and beyond: the danger of
escalation" [17 July 2006]).
Israel's strategy
The extensive Israeli air-force operations have so far failed
to stem the level of Hizbollah missile launches; indeed, these
have if anything intensified in recent days - another 110 were
launched on 27 July, bringing the total to more than 1,500
since the war began.
What has also become apparent is that the Israeli ground-force
operations that have so far been restricted to quite small
parts of southern Lebanon have turned out to be much more
difficult than expected, and have led to considerable civilian
casualties. The Hizbollah militia are well-prepared,
well-trained and determined, and they know intimately the
districts they are defending.
At the same time, it became clear on the night of 27-28 July
that the main aim of Israeli military operations is still to
destroy Hizbollah as any kind of military entity. This was
explicitly stated at the start of the war on 12 July, but the
problems the IDF has encountered subsequently have created the
impression of a weakening of this original war aim in the
direction of a mere degradation of Hizbollah's capability.
This simply is not the case: Israel is receiving very strong
encouragement from Washington to go the whole way, whatever it
takes in terms of destruction and civilian casualties.
Israeli government sources still see Hizbollah solely as a
terrorist organisation. There is no recognition of its wider
role in Lebanese society or its progressive integration into
Lebanese politics. These sources still declare as a formal aim
that the Lebanese government must take control of its entire
territory, without any appreciation of the point that
Hizbollah is a larger political party in the Lebanese
parliament than Likud is in the Knesset. The Israeli side even
professes a belief that the destruction being caused in
Lebanon will turn most Lebanese against Hizbollah. Again, the
evidence to date is in the opposite direction.
Even so, Israel will almost certainly continue to receive
direct military aid from the United States, especially of
precision-guided weapons; the advanced F-15I, the latest
American-made aircraft that has already been deployed in
bombing raids in Lebanon, is also part of the supply-chain
(see "Israel: the illusions of militarism", 5 June 2002). With
this combination of Washington's enthusiasm and Israel's
determination, this war really is taking on the mantle of a
joint United States-Israeli operation that is becoming
integral to George W Bush's global war on terror.
The al-Qaida movement has, as expected, been quick to
recognise the potential of this evolving situation (see
"Lebanon in the wider war", 25 July 2006). The taped message
of Ayman al-Zawahiri, broadcast on al-Jazeera on 26 July, came
almost exactly on cue ; immediately after the abortive Rome
summit, and just as Israel decided to escalate its rhetoric
and deployments, with firm support from the Bush
administration.
It is true that al-Qaida may have little sympathy for
Hizbollah in particular or for Shi'a Islam in general, but it
is also the case that such confessional differences matter
less outside Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran. It is very easy for
al-Qaida to portray the Lebanon war to the wider Islamic world
as a straightforward Zionist-crusader conspiracy, and this
will undoubtedly have a further radicalising effect.
Three ways to escalate
Unless there are major changes, the probability is that the
war in Lebanon will continue on its present path with an
intensification of air raids as towns and villages in southern
Lebanon are destroyed prior to temporary occupation by Israeli
troops. In parallel, operations will continue in Gaza, where
twenty-three people were killed yesterday, including three
children, and seventy wounded. The impact of the wars across
the region is escalating, even to the point where Bush's
strongest supporter, Tony Blair, may suggest the need for a
ceasefire.
A ceasefire will not happen. Instead, there are at least three
ways in which the conflict may escalate. The first is that
Israeli planes could attack trucks crossing the Syrian border
into Lebanon carrying military supplies for Hizbollah. The
clear indications that this is not effective could lead to a
second option, involving strong pressure on the Israeli air
force to strike across the border in Syria itself ; perhaps
specifically at a military air base near Damascus that is
reportedly the conduit for supplies from Iran. From a Syrian
perspective, as Israel intensifies its raids in the Beka'a
valley, so the need to support Hizbollah increases ; leading
in turn to the risk of this Israeli escalation.
Third, Israeli government sources make much of the intimate
involvement of Iran in Hizbollah's activities, even claiming
that there are large numbers of Iranian Revolutionary Guards
in Lebanon directly aiding the Hizbollah militias. There may
indeed be some cooperation, especially with advanced weapons
systems, but the overall interpretation of Hizbollah's
dependency seriously underestimates the group's independence.
One indication of this is that while Israel has detained
numerous Hizbollah activists and sympathisers in recent years,
there have been no reports that any Iranian nationals have
been among them.
But if Iranian involvement may be limited, the Tehran
government would be hugely reluctant to see Hizbollah worn
down by weeks or months of Israeli military action, and it
will attempt to provide further shipments of weapons.
Hizbollah is already reported to have a stock of Zelzal
missiles, and one possible escalation would be an attack on
Tel Aviv.
Much of northern Israel is currently devoid of significant
economic activity as people take to shelters or evacuate to
the south. If such a pattern was to stretch to central Israel
; bringing Hadera and Netanya as well as Tel Aviv-Jaffa within
range, the IDF would be forced to increase its activities,
possibly even to the point of a full invasion of southern
Lebanon.
The combination of Hizbollah's continuing attacks, Israel's
recent military difficulties and Washington's total support
for this part of the war on terror all mean that the conflict
will continue and escalate with unforeseen consequences. In
such circumstances, is there any prospect for a peaceful
resolution or at least an easing of the conflict?
Despite the very hawkish tones in Jerusalem and Washington,
there are wiser minds in both cities that possess a dawning
realisation of what has been unleashed, and are counselling
caution. Some now recognise that this war is not in Israel's
long-term security interests. This is not 1967 or 1982 ;
satellite TV coverage gives a much fuller picture of "facts on
the ground" and the escalation of military technologies suited
to asymmetric warfare means that no amount of "buffer-zones"
around Israel will keep the country safe in the future (see
"Israel: Losing Control", 20 July 2006)
The most positive immediate development would be a
forty-eight-hour ceasefire by Israel, unilateral but
indicating a further forty-eight-hour extension if Hizbollah
reciprocates. From there, intensive negotiations could evolve
rapidly, using the key role of the Amal party, the larger
Shi'a political grouping in the Lebanese parliament led by the
parliament's speaker, Nabih Berri.
At the time of writing the possibility of such a ceasefire
seems remote, but the next few days do represent such an
opportunity. More generally, the first two weeks of August
will be the period in which the longer-term development of
this war is determined. Either it will continue and escalate,
with consequences to be felt over years and decades, or it
might just possibly be brought under control. If it is
escalation not negotiation, then a substantial part of the
responsibility will lie with the one country that has some
degree of influence in Washington, namely Britain.
Lebanon: the world's choice Paul Rogers
Lebanon: the world's choice
Paul Rogers
28 - 7 - 2006
The first two weeks of August will be decisive in determining
whether the Lebanon war escalates further or can be contained.
Paul Rogers is professor of peace studies at Bradford
University, northern England. He has been writing a
weekly column on global security on openDemocracy since
October 2001
Paul Rogers tracks the July 2006 war in a series of
daily columns:
"Israel, Lebanon, and beyond: the danger of escalation"
(17 July 2006)
"War defeats diplomacy" (18 July 2006)
"A proxy war"
(19 July 2006)
"Israel: losing control" (20 July 2006)
"Hit Beirut, target Tehran" (21 July 2006)
"Lebanon in the wider war" (25 July 2006)
"Lebanon: no quick fix" (26 July 2006)
"A triple front: Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon"
(27 July 2006)
The failure of the emergency Rome summit on the middle east on
26 July to call for an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon has been
taken by the Ehud Olmert government in Israel to be a green
light for intensified military operations.
Israel is calling up three divisions of reservists -initially
around 15,000 troops, leading eventually to 30,000 - for what
is likely to be a protracted operation in southern Lebanon.
This, however, may not take the form of an all-out invasion
and occupation, not least because memories of the Israeli
Defence Forces (IDF) retreat from the region in the early
1980s are still a strong deterrent to that option.
Instead, the more likely development is devastating air
operations to clear localities, allowing IDF troops to operate
afterwards with less risk to themselves. Olmert's close ally,
the justice minister Haim Ramon, stated on Israeli army radio
on 27 July that the Israeli government had given sufficient
opportunity for civilians to leave southern Lebanon, and
Israel could therefore assume that "all those in south
Lebanon are terrorists who are related in some way to
Hizbollah".
In his view, this meant that villages could be destroyed by
the Israeli air force before ground troops moved in. The term
"scorched earth" usually refers to the behaviour of retreating
armies; the approach recommended here would, instead, be part
of an offensive operation.
The fact that the IDF feels obliged to embark on such a
strategy is an indication of the problems it is facing in
trying to control and defeat the Hizbollah movement. Some of
these problems have been covered in earlier columns in this
series over the past ten days; they include the continuing
large number of missiles being fired into northern Israel two
weeks after the war started, and the use of an advanced
anti-ship missile to cripple the Saar-5 missile corvette two
weeks ago (see "Israel, Lebanon, and beyond: the danger of
escalation" [17 July 2006]).
Israel's strategy
The extensive Israeli air-force operations have so far failed
to stem the level of Hizbollah missile launches; indeed, these
have if anything intensified in recent days - another 110 were
launched on 27 July, bringing the total to more than 1,500
since the war began.
What has also become apparent is that the Israeli ground-force
operations that have so far been restricted to quite small
parts of southern Lebanon have turned out to be much more
difficult than expected, and have led to considerable civilian
casualties. The Hizbollah militia are well-prepared,
well-trained and determined, and they know intimately the
districts they are defending.
At the same time, it became clear on the night of 27-28 July
that the main aim of Israeli military operations is still to
destroy Hizbollah as any kind of military entity. This was
explicitly stated at the start of the war on 12 July, but the
problems the IDF has encountered subsequently have created the
impression of a weakening of this original war aim in the
direction of a mere degradation of Hizbollah's capability.
This simply is not the case: Israel is receiving very strong
encouragement from Washington to go the whole way, whatever it
takes in terms of destruction and civilian casualties.
Israeli government sources still see Hizbollah solely as a
terrorist organisation. There is no recognition of its wider
role in Lebanese society or its progressive integration into
Lebanese politics. These sources still declare as a formal aim
that the Lebanese government must take control of its entire
territory, without any appreciation of the point that
Hizbollah is a larger political party in the Lebanese
parliament than Likud is in the Knesset. The Israeli side even
professes a belief that the destruction being caused in
Lebanon will turn most Lebanese against Hizbollah. Again, the
evidence to date is in the opposite direction.
Even so, Israel will almost certainly continue to receive
direct military aid from the United States, especially of
precision-guided weapons; the advanced F-15I, the latest
American-made aircraft that has already been deployed in
bombing raids in Lebanon, is also part of the supply-chain
(see "Israel: the illusions of militarism", 5 June 2002). With
this combination of Washington's enthusiasm and Israel's
determination, this war really is taking on the mantle of a
joint United States-Israeli operation that is becoming
integral to George W Bush's global war on terror.
The al-Qaida movement has, as expected, been quick to
recognise the potential of this evolving situation (see
"Lebanon in the wider war", 25 July 2006). The taped message
of Ayman al-Zawahiri, broadcast on al-Jazeera on 26 July, came
almost exactly on cue ; immediately after the abortive Rome
summit, and just as Israel decided to escalate its rhetoric
and deployments, with firm support from the Bush
administration.
It is true that al-Qaida may have little sympathy for
Hizbollah in particular or for Shi'a Islam in general, but it
is also the case that such confessional differences matter
less outside Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran. It is very easy for
al-Qaida to portray the Lebanon war to the wider Islamic world
as a straightforward Zionist-crusader conspiracy, and this
will undoubtedly have a further radicalising effect.
Three ways to escalate
Unless there are major changes, the probability is that the
war in Lebanon will continue on its present path with an
intensification of air raids as towns and villages in southern
Lebanon are destroyed prior to temporary occupation by Israeli
troops. In parallel, operations will continue in Gaza, where
twenty-three people were killed yesterday, including three
children, and seventy wounded. The impact of the wars across
the region is escalating, even to the point where Bush's
strongest supporter, Tony Blair, may suggest the need for a
ceasefire.
A ceasefire will not happen. Instead, there are at least three
ways in which the conflict may escalate. The first is that
Israeli planes could attack trucks crossing the Syrian border
into Lebanon carrying military supplies for Hizbollah. The
clear indications that this is not effective could lead to a
second option, involving strong pressure on the Israeli air
force to strike across the border in Syria itself ; perhaps
specifically at a military air base near Damascus that is
reportedly the conduit for supplies from Iran. From a Syrian
perspective, as Israel intensifies its raids in the Beka'a
valley, so the need to support Hizbollah increases ; leading
in turn to the risk of this Israeli escalation.
Third, Israeli government sources make much of the intimate
involvement of Iran in Hizbollah's activities, even claiming
that there are large numbers of Iranian Revolutionary Guards
in Lebanon directly aiding the Hizbollah militias. There may
indeed be some cooperation, especially with advanced weapons
systems, but the overall interpretation of Hizbollah's
dependency seriously underestimates the group's independence.
One indication of this is that while Israel has detained
numerous Hizbollah activists and sympathisers in recent years,
there have been no reports that any Iranian nationals have
been among them.
But if Iranian involvement may be limited, the Tehran
government would be hugely reluctant to see Hizbollah worn
down by weeks or months of Israeli military action, and it
will attempt to provide further shipments of weapons.
Hizbollah is already reported to have a stock of Zelzal
missiles, and one possible escalation would be an attack on
Tel Aviv.
Much of northern Israel is currently devoid of significant
economic activity as people take to shelters or evacuate to
the south. If such a pattern was to stretch to central Israel
; bringing Hadera and Netanya as well as Tel Aviv-Jaffa within
range, the IDF would be forced to increase its activities,
possibly even to the point of a full invasion of southern
Lebanon.
The combination of Hizbollah's continuing attacks, Israel's
recent military difficulties and Washington's total support
for this part of the war on terror all mean that the conflict
will continue and escalate with unforeseen consequences. In
such circumstances, is there any prospect for a peaceful
resolution or at least an easing of the conflict?
Despite the very hawkish tones in Jerusalem and Washington,
there are wiser minds in both cities that possess a dawning
realisation of what has been unleashed, and are counselling
caution. Some now recognise that this war is not in Israel's
long-term security interests. This is not 1967 or 1982 ;
satellite TV coverage gives a much fuller picture of "facts on
the ground" and the escalation of military technologies suited
to asymmetric warfare means that no amount of "buffer-zones"
around Israel will keep the country safe in the future (see
"Israel: Losing Control", 20 July 2006)
The most positive immediate development would be a
forty-eight-hour ceasefire by Israel, unilateral but
indicating a further forty-eight-hour extension if Hizbollah
reciprocates. From there, intensive negotiations could evolve
rapidly, using the key role of the Amal party, the larger
Shi'a political grouping in the Lebanese parliament led by the
parliament's speaker, Nabih Berri.
At the time of writing the possibility of such a ceasefire
seems remote, but the next few days do represent such an
opportunity. More generally, the first two weeks of August
will be the period in which the longer-term development of
this war is determined. Either it will continue and escalate,
with consequences to be felt over years and decades, or it
might just possibly be brought under control. If it is
escalation not negotiation, then a substantial part of the
responsibility will lie with the one country that has some
degree of influence in Washington, namely Britain.
