There is no chance in the burning fires of hell that Moeen would ever be allowed to president, even if he gets a clear 10% lead or anything - but at least it would show the true undemocratic nature of the regime and that their elections are a true farce.
This is the reason why people should vote for moeen I believe, he's got the right idea and if he really intends what he says (i.e. freeing political prisoners and making them members of his cabinet), he deserves a shot - besides he's the best we could hope for, theres not going to be any peaceful revolution or regime downfall any time soon.
This is the reason why people should vote for moeen I believe, he's got the right idea and if he really intends what he says (i.e. freeing political prisoners and making them members of his cabinet), he deserves a shot - besides he's the best we could hope for, theres not going to be any peaceful revolution or regime downfall any time soon.
In the first round of these elections, I am inclined to support Qalibaf first, Moin second. In other words, ideally I want a Moin versus Qalibaf race in the next round.
In that equation, I also want Rafsanjani to then side with the reformists and back Moin. That would then create a strong enough, and popular enough, reformist party. One with roots inside the regime's aparatus of power, both in the organs controlled by reformists through the executive branch as well as through many of the informal and unelected branches were Rafsanjani still holds sway.
In the other camp, you would have Qalibaf, who to win the election against Moin, would then need to work to further improve the image and positions fo the "fundamentalist" party. On their side, you would have many of the nationalist-military figures, the rank and file of the revolutionary guards, as well as the institutions beholden to Khamenie. Now, since the latter often are an "extra baggage" and are unpopular, hopefully that would mean that Qalibaf would have an interest in convincing Khamenie to "reform" the image of those institutions too.
From that kind of race, I hope to see two serious parties develop, each with more or less enlightened ideas and approaches as they compete to win people's hearts and minds.
That is what I like to see from this election.
In that equation, I also want Rafsanjani to then side with the reformists and back Moin. That would then create a strong enough, and popular enough, reformist party. One with roots inside the regime's aparatus of power, both in the organs controlled by reformists through the executive branch as well as through many of the informal and unelected branches were Rafsanjani still holds sway.
In the other camp, you would have Qalibaf, who to win the election against Moin, would then need to work to further improve the image and positions fo the "fundamentalist" party. On their side, you would have many of the nationalist-military figures, the rank and file of the revolutionary guards, as well as the institutions beholden to Khamenie. Now, since the latter often are an "extra baggage" and are unpopular, hopefully that would mean that Qalibaf would have an interest in convincing Khamenie to "reform" the image of those institutions too.
From that kind of race, I hope to see two serious parties develop, each with more or less enlightened ideas and approaches as they compete to win people's hearts and minds.
That is what I like to see from this election.
That is the base of support for Qalibaf and one of the reasons why, even when he was not the candidate of either wing of the "establishment" (Khamenie or Rafsanjani), he nonetheless immediately had strong enough showing in the polls. Basically, the more nationalist elements in Iran, including many even among the middle class, and certainly within the military and the revolutionary guards, are supporting Qalibaf. The more ideological members of the revolutionary guards, on the other hand, support Ahmadinejad. The ones who follow Khamenie were inclined towards Larijani, although now they feel freer to pick the one they think is going to win (Qalibaf).
I think it the current international environment, Iran needs a president that does not come with all the baggage that Rafs comes with. Moein fits the bill the best amongst the current candidates. I am afraid that if Rafs becomes president, US will increase the pressures citing the murky history of Rafs.
My ideal scenario is for Moein to win and then enter an alliance with rafs, perhaps naming him as a personal adviser, or some other semi-official function. Moein has a lot to learn from Rafs in terms of wheeling and dealing. I think Moein needs Rafs to be as effective as possible in executing on the agenda he has set forth.
My ideal scenario is for Moein to win and then enter an alliance with rafs, perhaps naming him as a personal adviser, or some other semi-official function. Moein has a lot to learn from Rafs in terms of wheeling and dealing. I think Moein needs Rafs to be as effective as possible in executing on the agenda he has set forth.
great post ken,
what u said, was a possibility if rafsanjani decided not to come. this is what everyone thought will happen but its different now.
Rafsanjani has too many votes and its wrong to count him out.he will be in the top two.
and now that ahmadinejad has gained " abadgaran" support ghalibaf will probably become fourth.
what u said, was a possibility if rafsanjani decided not to come. this is what everyone thought will happen but its different now.
Rafsanjani has too many votes and its wrong to count him out.he will be in the top two.
and now that ahmadinejad has gained " abadgaran" support ghalibaf will probably become fourth.
Moeeen would have been the ideal president if there were no "rasti" no "gorooh feshar" no " shorayeh negahban" no "majlis!"
I dont think he can do anything with all of them against him. think like this...
vaghti khodesh raddeh salahiyat misheh, diggeh layeh ke be majlis bekhad bedeh ghabl az inke neveshteh besheh rad shodeh...
and we'll face a big chaos in Iran.
I dont think he can do anything with all of them against him. think like this...
vaghti khodesh raddeh salahiyat misheh, diggeh layeh ke be majlis bekhad bedeh ghabl az inke neveshteh besheh rad shodeh...
and we'll face a big chaos in Iran.
I was hoping Rafsanjani would not run, and instead would decide to back the reformists. But I still think what I outlined is possible, though I agree it is not likely given that Rafsanjani seems to be the "front runner" in these polls.
The last poll I saw showed a tight race between Rafsanjani and Qalibaf (both in the low 20s, separated by only 2 points within the margn of error), with Moin around 10%. Moin's numbers are undoubtedly understated, for three reasons: first a lot of the undecided voters will go for him; second, given our political culture and fears that some people still have, respondents are more likely not to pick Moin in these polls than Rasfsanjani or Qalibaf. I also believe Qalibaf will grab a lot of those undecided votes because of the "movement" in the polls in the direction of Qalibaf.
At the end, however, Iran's election is too close and difficult to predict. Within reason, anything is possible. Rafsanjani is probably going to get enough votes to make the runoff, as shown by all polls, but I wouldn't be entirely surprised if he ends in 3rd place.
The last poll I saw showed a tight race between Rafsanjani and Qalibaf (both in the low 20s, separated by only 2 points within the margn of error), with Moin around 10%. Moin's numbers are undoubtedly understated, for three reasons: first a lot of the undecided voters will go for him; second, given our political culture and fears that some people still have, respondents are more likely not to pick Moin in these polls than Rasfsanjani or Qalibaf. I also believe Qalibaf will grab a lot of those undecided votes because of the "movement" in the polls in the direction of Qalibaf.
At the end, however, Iran's election is too close and difficult to predict. Within reason, anything is possible. Rafsanjani is probably going to get enough votes to make the runoff, as shown by all polls, but I wouldn't be entirely surprised if he ends in 3rd place.
Dear ken,
Your answer is again a statement that repeats your previous point, not a evidence. The rank and file revolutionary guards, even higher ranks, have the same political tendencies and opinions as majority of people. That's why according to statistics that were published in 1997, 80% of the members of Bassij and revolutionary guards voted for Khatami.
I think, similar to many of our compatriots outside of Iran, your statement is more based on your presumptions about the Iranian society and government, not the facts on the ground. Otherwise, would you please provide me with some hard evidences or indications that:
1) shows that the nationalistic or ideological tendencies are higher in revolutionary guards than ordinary Iranians?
2) shows that those with nationalistic views are more inclined toward Ghalibaf (not your statement that "they must be". I am looking for some actual evidence).
3) shows that Ghalibaf's base of support is among military elements?
I suspect in all these cases your answer would be more similar to : "It must be, because in my viewpoint that makes more sense." That's what I call "presumptions".
Your answer is again a statement that repeats your previous point, not a evidence. The rank and file revolutionary guards, even higher ranks, have the same political tendencies and opinions as majority of people. That's why according to statistics that were published in 1997, 80% of the members of Bassij and revolutionary guards voted for Khatami.
I think, similar to many of our compatriots outside of Iran, your statement is more based on your presumptions about the Iranian society and government, not the facts on the ground. Otherwise, would you please provide me with some hard evidences or indications that:
1) shows that the nationalistic or ideological tendencies are higher in revolutionary guards than ordinary Iranians?
2) shows that those with nationalistic views are more inclined toward Ghalibaf (not your statement that "they must be". I am looking for some actual evidence).
3) shows that Ghalibaf's base of support is among military elements?
I suspect in all these cases your answer would be more similar to : "It must be, because in my viewpoint that makes more sense." That's what I call "presumptions".
Is that so? You are swell too!
Can you post the poll that supports the comments you just made above regarding you "presumptions" on revolutionary guard rank and file attitudes regarding Qalibaf? Whle you are at it, I want you to back up your views on boycott, regime change, etc as well. I don't find them based on anything except your wishes.
As for me:
My "assumption" on the base of support for Qalibaf comes from reports that regularly appear on the subject in the press, although I don't recall any "polls" per se concentrating on the rank and file of the revolutionary guards as it relates to this election.
On the other hand, the "poll" you mentioned regarding Khatami's support among the revolutionary guards in 1997 being the SAME as the general population, well you are wrong: You are wrong about the date of the so-called poll, as well as the fact there were no specifics about it. All you know about that is a snipet you read several years ago in one of these articles that talked about how the revolutionary guards and the clerics were opposed to the regime too, using support for Khatami among many lower officers (certainly not in the same exact percentage as in the general population) as support for "regime change"! Post the article were you read "about" that poll! Lets see its source, its assertions, and its methodology!
As for the socio-political and ideological issues that underpin attitudes in the rank and file of the revolutionary guards, viz a viz the society as a whole, it is ridiculous to think that the revolutionary guards rank and file is a mirror of the rest of society. There are times and there are leaders that unite a large enough chuck of the people, like Khatami once did, when differences take a back seat to common demands. Even then, the percentage of say "students and women" who voted for Khatami is not at all the same as the percentages among the revolutionary guards! The fact is that there are various demographics, socio-economic factors, and ideological biases arises form different professions, influence people's attitudes. That is basic sociology.
Of course, it is unfair for me to ask you to post a poll on the attitudes of the revolutionary guards viz a viz Qalibaf as it is for you to ask me to do so because I don't recall any such polls in the first place! But I trust that when the reformers are complaining that the rank and file revolutionary guard members are "campaigning" for Qalibaf and trying to convince their family members to vote for him, that he must have some support among them! Especially since the guy is still doing well in the polls, and given that he began without any official endorcements from the major clerical groups.
Can you post the poll that supports the comments you just made above regarding you "presumptions" on revolutionary guard rank and file attitudes regarding Qalibaf? Whle you are at it, I want you to back up your views on boycott, regime change, etc as well. I don't find them based on anything except your wishes.
As for me:
My "assumption" on the base of support for Qalibaf comes from reports that regularly appear on the subject in the press, although I don't recall any "polls" per se concentrating on the rank and file of the revolutionary guards as it relates to this election.
On the other hand, the "poll" you mentioned regarding Khatami's support among the revolutionary guards in 1997 being the SAME as the general population, well you are wrong: You are wrong about the date of the so-called poll, as well as the fact there were no specifics about it. All you know about that is a snipet you read several years ago in one of these articles that talked about how the revolutionary guards and the clerics were opposed to the regime too, using support for Khatami among many lower officers (certainly not in the same exact percentage as in the general population) as support for "regime change"! Post the article were you read "about" that poll! Lets see its source, its assertions, and its methodology!
As for the socio-political and ideological issues that underpin attitudes in the rank and file of the revolutionary guards, viz a viz the society as a whole, it is ridiculous to think that the revolutionary guards rank and file is a mirror of the rest of society. There are times and there are leaders that unite a large enough chuck of the people, like Khatami once did, when differences take a back seat to common demands. Even then, the percentage of say "students and women" who voted for Khatami is not at all the same as the percentages among the revolutionary guards! The fact is that there are various demographics, socio-economic factors, and ideological biases arises form different professions, influence people's attitudes. That is basic sociology.
Of course, it is unfair for me to ask you to post a poll on the attitudes of the revolutionary guards viz a viz Qalibaf as it is for you to ask me to do so because I don't recall any such polls in the first place! But I trust that when the reformers are complaining that the rank and file revolutionary guard members are "campaigning" for Qalibaf and trying to convince their family members to vote for him, that he must have some support among them! Especially since the guy is still doing well in the polls, and given that he began without any official endorcements from the major clerical groups.
Dear Ken,
I will try to dig up that report for you, but I think your statements in the above clearly shows to me where your presumptions come from. You think it is ridiculous to think that rank and file revolutionary guards think more or less in the same way as people, but you do not offer any evidence for that except "basic sociology".
For me, sociological theories take a back seat when confronted with hard facts from one's own experience. I lived for more than 20 years under the Islamic revolution with no specific bias against or toward it. I met and socialize throughout my life with different groups and classes of Iranians, including many guards, bassijis, bazaris, saltanat-talabs, etc.
My experience in Iran tells me that regardless of what sociological theories say, the politics and society in Iran are quite different from what it looks like from a distance. That the Iranian society hides itself behind a smokescreen. Probably similar to the situation that they say the soviete union had during the last years of Brezhnev.
My experience in Iran also tells me that the ideological engine of the Islamic republic has died long time ago. That the rank and file revolutionary guards do not behave or think much different than what average people in Iran do. So are the Baazaris, IRI beurucrats etc.
That's why many theorists who enthusiastically try to draw conclusions and solutions based on their presumptions of what the Iranian society must be, get disappointed at the end. But I think at this point, we have nothing to debate further because we use completely different assumption bases. I would have liked your solutions to prevail. I am afraid, I do not think they are realistic at all. So, good luck.
I will try to dig up that report for you, but I think your statements in the above clearly shows to me where your presumptions come from. You think it is ridiculous to think that rank and file revolutionary guards think more or less in the same way as people, but you do not offer any evidence for that except "basic sociology".
For me, sociological theories take a back seat when confronted with hard facts from one's own experience. I lived for more than 20 years under the Islamic revolution with no specific bias against or toward it. I met and socialize throughout my life with different groups and classes of Iranians, including many guards, bassijis, bazaris, saltanat-talabs, etc.
My experience in Iran tells me that regardless of what sociological theories say, the politics and society in Iran are quite different from what it looks like from a distance. That the Iranian society hides itself behind a smokescreen. Probably similar to the situation that they say the soviete union had during the last years of Brezhnev.
My experience in Iran also tells me that the ideological engine of the Islamic republic has died long time ago. That the rank and file revolutionary guards do not behave or think much different than what average people in Iran do. So are the Baazaris, IRI beurucrats etc.
That's why many theorists who enthusiastically try to draw conclusions and solutions based on their presumptions of what the Iranian society must be, get disappointed at the end. But I think at this point, we have nothing to debate further because we use completely different assumption bases. I would have liked your solutions to prevail. I am afraid, I do not think they are realistic at all. So, good luck.
I don't know if you bothered reading the constitution, but here is another link for you where I discussed the issue you raise about the wanning of the ideological sentiment in Iran. I wrote this mostly back in 1995, with minor revisions since, and I cite it here for you to realize that what you say is not something I don't recognize. I agree with it in part. But things have changed since then too, and a new ideology (what I call "Safavi Iranian nationalism", which incorporates "Pahlavi nationalism" as well) is gaining ground replacing the old militant Islamic ideology left after Khomeini. The latter is something you might have missed.
Otherwise, what you refer to is what I discussed in the following chapter in my book regarding "growing disilluisonment with the regime":
http://www.perspolis2020.com/chapter3.html
Otherwise, what you refer to is what I discussed in the following chapter in my book regarding "growing disilluisonment with the regime":
http://www.perspolis2020.com/chapter3.html
spinhead Jan, then Why are you voting ???!!!
If you are " highly skeptical" that the count will not be fair, then why vote??!!!
I am confused about your logic here. I understand if you think this is fair process and your vote will make a difference and then vote.
But your above statement makes me really confuse.
If you are " highly skeptical" that the count will not be fair, then why vote??!!!
I am confused about your logic here. I understand if you think this is fair process and your vote will make a difference and then vote.
But your above statement makes me really confuse.
LOL@your Moeen comment. hehe true!
but Rafs is both rasti and chapi. I mean he is more conservative than Liberal actually(if we assume these polit terms mean anything in Iran!).
so if u really really have to participate or else u cant sleep the night after, I would go for Moeen if I were you.
he cant do anything and will be a worse puppet than Khatami but atleast he comes from an Educated background.
but Rafs is both rasti and chapi. I mean he is more conservative than Liberal actually(if we assume these polit terms mean anything in Iran!).
so if u really really have to participate or else u cant sleep the night after, I would go for Moeen if I were you.
he cant do anything and will be a worse puppet than Khatami but atleast he comes from an Educated background.
Good question my friend. I don't trust the hardline conservatives and believe they are capable of cheating. In a way they have already cheated by the actions of the Guardian Council eliminating most of the reformist candidates in this election as well as the majles election. Having said that, I also believe that we have to play with the hand we're dealt. We have to do our best within this limited framework and push the limits further toward freedom and democracy. Also I believe a strong turn out would be a kind of vacceen shot for us against foreign intervention which knocking at our door. This is more important to me as I have said before, first we have to have country, then we can work, hope, and struggle towards her freedom. Hope this answers your question. spin