This is my letter to The Washington Post in response to their editorial in today's paper, titled "Iran's Nuclear Program."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/08/AR2005080801369.html
My Letter:
Dear Editor,
An August 9 editorial, "Iran's Nuclear Program," stated that by choosing to reject the E3/EU proposal, Iran has revealed that its nuclear intention is not benign and is for the purpose of building nuclear weapons.
This statement is false. Iran has stated all along that it considers the mastery of the nuclear cycle as a sovereign right as envisioned in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Throughout the negotiations with the European powers, Iran has stated that it will consider inspection or verification mechanisms that go beyond its legal obligations, but will not give up its right to enrich uranium. This is a view that has the broad support of the Iranian public, conservatives, reformists, and dissidents alike.
In rejecting the E3/EU proposal to permanently cease uranium enrichment, Iran has violated neither the spirit or letter of the Paris Agreement of November 2004. The Paris Agreement stated that Iran "voluntarily" ceased uranium enrichment as a confidence building measure while negotiations "proceeded on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements." In essence, Iran saw the purpose of the Paris Agreement as a means to demonstrate that it was not in a hurry to seek nuclear arms and that it cared to provide transparency in its civilian nuclear activities, including the enrichment of uranium.
At this point, when the French Foreign Minister has publicly accussed Iran of violating the Paris Agreement, it is worthy to consider that the agreement itself begins by affirming that "the E3/EU recognize Iran's rights under the NPT excercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination." Considering that other non-nuclear weapon NPT signatories (Brazil, Canada, Germany, Japan, South Korea, etc.) enrich uranium, it is not surprising that Iran considers it discriminatory to be threatened not to do so.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy to consider that Iran agreed to the confidence building measures in 2004 at a time when it was accused of conducting Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) experiments and misleading the IAEA on the number of centrifuge components it had. On both counts the IAEA has publicly exonerated Iran. In the case of Iran's verification of centrifuges components, the IAEA admitted fault when presented with Iranian tape recordings of communication between its staff and Iranian officials, who are recorded as correctly verifing all the components. In the case HEU experiments, the IAEA confirmed Iran's story that the HEU particles came from contaminated components it imported from Pakistan after subsequently testing samples taken from Pakistani reactors. Despite the revelation of these facts since the signing of the Paris Agreement, the Europeans have failed to reciprocate Iran's goodwill by recognizing its right to enrich uranium. In contrast, South Korea has not been censured (by the Western representatives on the IAEA Board of Governors) for the HEU experiments it was found out to have secretly conducted in 2004, much less asked to give up uranium enrichment.
In conclusion, it is unjustified to equate Iran's refusal to give up uranium enrichment as Tehran's rejection of assuming a "responsible role in the international community." In rejecting the E3/EU proposal to permanently give up uranium enrichment, Iran is simply saying that it will not give up its sovereign rights as protected by the NPT. For a country with expansive uranium reserves, it makes no sense to rely on a foreign supply of nuclear fuel while even those non-nuclear weapon NPT signatories with no uranium reserves (Germany, Japan, and South Korea) enrich their own uranium.
Sincerely,
Taymaz Rastin
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/08/AR2005080801369.html
My Letter:
Dear Editor,
An August 9 editorial, "Iran's Nuclear Program," stated that by choosing to reject the E3/EU proposal, Iran has revealed that its nuclear intention is not benign and is for the purpose of building nuclear weapons.
This statement is false. Iran has stated all along that it considers the mastery of the nuclear cycle as a sovereign right as envisioned in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Throughout the negotiations with the European powers, Iran has stated that it will consider inspection or verification mechanisms that go beyond its legal obligations, but will not give up its right to enrich uranium. This is a view that has the broad support of the Iranian public, conservatives, reformists, and dissidents alike.
In rejecting the E3/EU proposal to permanently cease uranium enrichment, Iran has violated neither the spirit or letter of the Paris Agreement of November 2004. The Paris Agreement stated that Iran "voluntarily" ceased uranium enrichment as a confidence building measure while negotiations "proceeded on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements." In essence, Iran saw the purpose of the Paris Agreement as a means to demonstrate that it was not in a hurry to seek nuclear arms and that it cared to provide transparency in its civilian nuclear activities, including the enrichment of uranium.
At this point, when the French Foreign Minister has publicly accussed Iran of violating the Paris Agreement, it is worthy to consider that the agreement itself begins by affirming that "the E3/EU recognize Iran's rights under the NPT excercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination." Considering that other non-nuclear weapon NPT signatories (Brazil, Canada, Germany, Japan, South Korea, etc.) enrich uranium, it is not surprising that Iran considers it discriminatory to be threatened not to do so.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy to consider that Iran agreed to the confidence building measures in 2004 at a time when it was accused of conducting Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) experiments and misleading the IAEA on the number of centrifuge components it had. On both counts the IAEA has publicly exonerated Iran. In the case of Iran's verification of centrifuges components, the IAEA admitted fault when presented with Iranian tape recordings of communication between its staff and Iranian officials, who are recorded as correctly verifing all the components. In the case HEU experiments, the IAEA confirmed Iran's story that the HEU particles came from contaminated components it imported from Pakistan after subsequently testing samples taken from Pakistani reactors. Despite the revelation of these facts since the signing of the Paris Agreement, the Europeans have failed to reciprocate Iran's goodwill by recognizing its right to enrich uranium. In contrast, South Korea has not been censured (by the Western representatives on the IAEA Board of Governors) for the HEU experiments it was found out to have secretly conducted in 2004, much less asked to give up uranium enrichment.
In conclusion, it is unjustified to equate Iran's refusal to give up uranium enrichment as Tehran's rejection of assuming a "responsible role in the international community." In rejecting the E3/EU proposal to permanently give up uranium enrichment, Iran is simply saying that it will not give up its sovereign rights as protected by the NPT. For a country with expansive uranium reserves, it makes no sense to rely on a foreign supply of nuclear fuel while even those non-nuclear weapon NPT signatories with no uranium reserves (Germany, Japan, and South Korea) enrich their own uranium.
Sincerely,
Taymaz Rastin
