San Marco, from saint to public enemy: the Dutch hypocrisy
The Dutch branch is one of the most renowned schools of football throughout the world. Its status is not solely due to the upbringing of illustrious players in the likes of the great Cruyff, Van Basten, Gullit, Rijkkaard and many more, neither does Holland take a special place in the heart of the game only because of its breath taking football in ’74 and ‘78. What makes their school of football “Dutch” is their 4-3-3 system.
This system, in the words of Cruyff, ‘allows maximum field occupation’, and its emphasis is on three aspects: ball possession, ball circulation and the best use of space. By an even occupation over the wings and the middle of the pitch, the team threats to break out from every possible position. In post-modern football, in which the backs are an essential part of the attacking strategy of teams playing 4-4-2, it means crippling the opponents by freezing their backs. Furthermore, it means closing down as much as possible space for the opponent by having players present in all areas. This all is meant to, and if carried out well it will lead to, controlling the opponent and the opportunity to regain the possession over the ball as soon as possible.
When being in possession over the ball, it requires minimum movement of players to realize a situation of maximum possible triangles. The reason for it is that the player holding the ball has maximum delivery options. For example, when the left midfielders holds the ball, he could pass it to the left winger, to the centre forward, to the central midfielder, to the central defender or to the left back; these players are all situated from 15 to 20 metres from him as this system requires that there is a maximum distance of fifteen metres between the each line. Therefore, the ideal length of the team is 35 to 45 metres. The point being made is that due to the maximum delivery options situation, the ball can circulate quickly and over ground. Therefore, a change from wing to wing, a penetration through the same wing, or through the middle, is a matter of minimum passes, if carried out quickly and justly.
This brings us to the third virtue: the best use of space. As it has become clear, the use of space is central to this concept. Not only it obligates the backs to man-mark forwards, it also enables the team to create maximum playing possibilities with minimum effort. Whilst a winger in the 4-4-2 system has to cover 60 metres from a defending position to an attacking one, in 4-3-3 the winger runs about 30 metres. It also creates space between the backs and the central defenders, as the backs are strictly limited to the wings.
This basic tactical, and for some readers perhaps boring, discussion of the 4-3-3 system is essential in explaining my points in this writing. First is that the likes of Cruyff, Van Basten and Gullit do not take their status in the game solely on the basis of their extraordinary techniques and physiques, but a large portion of this merit is thanks to their unique tactical understanding of team play and use of space. The foundation and the sharpening of this tactical brilliance roots back to the Dutch school of 4-3-3. The very same goes for their total football, which in the foremost place was tactical genius. The Dutch football tams of 74 and 78 would not have been remembered in the same way had it not been for the 4-3-3.
The second point which I want to make is that after having won the European Cup in 1988, Dutch football has known one sole achievement which spoke of dominance: the CL trophy won by Ajax in the mid nineties. The national team, however, played a 4-4-2 system throughout the 90’s and did not win one sole tournament, neither did it manage to reach to the final. The golden Ajax generation that conquered Europe with 4-3-3 was to be named the “just-too-short-generation” in the national team. In this period, going along with the ‘globalization’ of football, many Dutch teams, professional as well as amateur ones, chose for the 4-4-2 system.
It was then that Cruyff started the prophecy of the disasterous future of Dutch football; he had noted the shift away from the 4-4-2 and warned for jeopardizing the very fundaments of Dutch football. He noted that the Dutch educational system, which had always been based on 4-3-3 and in which basic technique played an essential part, neglected these aspects and focused on physical strength and long balls. In Cruyff’s vision, the tactical brilliance that was the hallmark of their school was being destroyed. While respecting his view, nobody really considered his doom scenario. That is until Holland failed to qualify for WC’02 which was a national disaster. From that point, people, and especially the KNVB (the Dutch football association) started to carefully listen to what Cruyff had to say. After the semi-final loss against Portugal, the weak status of Dutch clubs in Europe and the irritating elite-like behaviour of their internationals, the KNVB went to Cruyff for advice. His advice was simple: we don’t have the fighting spirit of the English, the consistency of the Germans, the cleverness of the Italians or the infinite pool of talent of the Argentineans and the Brazilians. What we do have is a unique tradition of tactical perfection. And we need to go back to those roots, that is what makes us distinct, that is what makes our football Dutch. And it is there where our strength lies. This is the third point that I wanted to make: the KNVB decided to fall back on 4-3-3 under the motto “we haven’t been able to won anything with the 4-4-2 so we can just as well profile ourselves with our own system”. Cruyff advised the KNVB to consider Van Basten for the job, who had kept himself away from football for ten years then, as in Cruyff’s vision he had the character and the genius to do it. And above all, the guts to throw everything around.
And that is exactly what Van Basten did. The veterans, with the exception if a few, were put aside and he welcomed man newcomers. He strictly chose for the 4-3-3 system and said that his goal was to play “attacking, attractive and dominant” football. His new approach and the new national team became accessible to every player who played well, regardless of their name. This created an accessible image for the public as well, as the national team did no longer belong to those select footballers that every coach had chosen in the past ten years. He gave the national team back to the folks, and due to his status as the player that he was, and his relaxed relation with the media, he gained a lot of credit with the public. Since he had changed everything and started to build a new team of a new generation of footballers, the evaluation date by the KNVB was set for Euro ’08. Qualifying for WC’06 was seen as an extra bonus, but not a must. He realised the easiest qualification in Dutch history however, and Holland survived the group of death, portraying decent performances.
The turning point, however, was the 1/8th final against Portugal. In a life or death battle, in which the experienced and clever Portuguese frustrated the young Dutch footballers and got them totally of concentration, Holland lost and Van Basten’s declarations that we should understand that we don’t have the quality depth that teams like Argentina, Brazil and Italy have nor the experience and mentality like the Germans, alongside him giving a 7 on a scale of 1 tot 10 to his own coaching, irritated the people. Extra oil on the fire was his decisions to send Van Nistelrooy and Van Bommel in exile: he didn’t call them up for the friendly games following the WC and hadn’t called them for an explanation. They went to the media and it became a national matter. Van Basten declared that he didn’t have to treat the internationals like babies. This added to his already arrogant image. He said that Van Bommel neglected his defensive duties, which was Van Basten’s critique prior to the WC as well, and that Van Nistelrooy lacks the proper technique to function as the central forward in the 4-3-3 (in this system, unlike the 4-4-2, a lot more participation and ball circulation is expected form the central forward). In his defence, it was Maniche, Van Bommel’s direct opponent, who walked away from Van Bommel’s back and was totally unmarked when he received and shot the ball in the goal. The winning 1-0! And as far as Van Nistelrooy is concerned, he is a natural finisher, but he is not exactly Maradona’s twin.
Van Nistelrooy was eventually called up again due to his high scoring rate at Real, and after a bit of wining and playing hard to get, he returned. So did Seedorf. And Holland kept on winning, though not by spectacular games, and easily qualified for the European Cup.
Meanwhile, Van Basten has turned into public enemy number one of the Dutch, a nation that in this way expresses their national hypocrisy when it comes to football. Before Van Basten, during the 4-4-2 period, the national team was criticized for being the collection of a bunch of individualists, that it formed no team, and that it had a hard time qualifying. The results were poor. Well, if anything, Van Basten has put together a team that walks through fire for each other, that is eager to win, that is hungry and that is humble. Their collectivistic attitude would make the likes of Marx jealous.
Now they say that it is the 4-3-3 system that doesn’t function well and blame him for holding on to it too tightly. Yet, the very purpose of him being appointed was to revive the Dutch school of football. Then they argue about why he puts a right footed player on left and vice versa. The reason for it is simple: Robben is injured and so is Van Persie (the left footed right winger that does operate well on right). This leaves Van Basten with no quality wingers. In order to add an extra surprising element to their game, he puts a left footer on right, so that his direct opponent does not know whether he will go along the line of will cut in and shoot. Besides, the best operating 4-3-3 in the world now is Barcelona, not accidentally also advised by Cruyff, and it is the same situation there: Messi on right, Ronaldinho on left. So it doesn’t necessarily have to be a problem.
Then, after having led 42 matches as head coach he has only lost 4!! The best average of all national coaches in the history of Holland. Two of those losses didn’t even matter as they were friendly games. His team has received 3 goals in this qualification and if they win tomorrow Holland will be the highest seeded team in the tournament, winning the only spot up for grabs as group head.
This is not to say that there is absolutely no short coming to notice. Of course, they only scored 11 goals in 14 matches. It is a low average. The scoring department should be fixed. But then again, against Luxemburg Holland had about 29 shots on goal and scored solely once. And there were at least 4 one-on-ones, and many shots on the 16 which could have had been sealed. At times there were great combinations and spectacular plays. But in the end, the newspapers crucified Van Basten again for boring and unspectacular play and the lack of goals, and so did the public. Well, in the first place, it was definitely not boring or low in quality. Secondly, what can he do? Bench Van Nistelrooy for having missed two one-on-ones? If he does so, then they will all blame him for leaving out their top marksman!
And the most ridiculous claim is that Van Basten does not know what it takes to make a central forward function is his team. The hypocrisy derives from the opinion, shared by the criticasters, that Van Basten is unarguably the best central striker in the history of the game. A genius. According to that notion, it would be illogic to claim that he has no clue about the needs are for a striker to function well!
Through all this critique, which has seen Marco van Basten become form hero to public enemy, Johan Cruyff’s unconditional support for him and the 4-3-3 plays a central role. People have got tired of him too! While a couple of years ago there was a national saying “Cruyff is always right”, now people publicly say that he doesn’t know where he is talking about and that he is a weak analyst. That is a hypocrite remark about arguably the world’s most intelligent football player in history. And as a coach, whose main instrument is analysing, he led arguably the most attractive playing club-side ever, Barcelona of ’94.
Much of this critique is shared by the international media. But you can’t expect much from them. First, many of them really don’t have a clue of what they actually are typing. Second, they are mostly followers; if somebody shouts something, they will simply echo it. Third, they do not know the ins and outs of the discussion and situation I described above.
The disappointment I am experiencing regards the Dutch public. Their expectations always immensely high, as they not only want to win, but they want to do it in the most beautiful way. There is nothing wrong with wanting that, but a realistic evaluation would not be out of place, since nobody winning the World/European Cup in the past decade and a half has done it with a great offensive style. They seem such hypocrites: they want change, but don’t give time for it; they know the reasons for Van Basten’s appointment, but act like they have forgotten; they say he is a genius, but try to understand him; they remember booing Seedorf until 2004, but sympathise him when Van Basten doesn’t select him; they act like Van Bommel is better than Deco, Sneijder better than Pirlo, Van persie better than Messi, Van Nistelrooy better than…anybody; Seedorf better than Kaka!!
And themselves higher football geniuses than Van Basten.
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? And I consider Babel another great player playing for a big club. 
